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Philosophy
RICHARD C. TAYLOR

Although the original meaning of the Greek term 'philosophy' (jalsafa in
Arabic) is 'love of wisdom', philosophy encompasses a wide variety of methods
and subjects, including the structure of reality, the character of human actions,
the nature of the divine and much more. Philosophical method certainly
includes human rational argumentative discourse and investigation (al-na?an
by the use of intellect (bi-l-'aql) in the search for what is true or right in the
realms of nature, metaphysics and ethics. If understood in this sense, philosophy - or something much like it, employing many of the methods found in
philosophy - can be seen in Islam among the mutakallimun or practitioners of
kalam (Islamic argumentative theology) well before the advent of the falasifa,
or philosophers working in the framework of Platonic and Aristotelian
thought. The Arabic term kalam has many senses, including speech, word,
account and more, depending on context, including Divine Speech. Some later
well-known philosophers of the classical rationalist period, such as al-EirabT,
Ibn S-ma/ Avicenna and Ibn Rushd/ Averroes, commonly regarded kalam as
unscientific dialectical argumentation in defence of basic tenets of the Islamic
faith. However, some of the proponents of'ilm al-kalam, the science of kalam,
regarded themselves as engaged in expounding issues which today would
commonly be considered within the purview of philosophy, even if 'the primary
function of kalam - its end and its activity - is to rationalise the basic beliefs of
the Muslims as they are given in the Koran and the Sunna and are present in the
way these are read and understood by orthodox believers'.' To this extent it
seems appropriate to call kalam a distinctly philosophical theology. From the
advent in the Islamic milieu of falsafa as a widely recognised intellectual
I R. M. Frank, 'The science of kaliim', Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 2 (1992) p. 22. Also see
Harry A. Wolfson, The philosophy afthe kalam (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1976); and

the authoritative and comprehensive work ofJosef van Ess, Thealogie und Gesellschaft im 2.
und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: cine Geschichte des religiosen Denkens im friihen Islam, 6 vols.
(Berlin and New York, 1991-7).
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discipline in the third 1ninth century, kalam and falsafa existed as parallel
discourses on issues of physics, metaphysics and ethics. They involved distinct
principles and analyses, with kalam having a place inside religious institutions
such as schools and mosques, while falsafa was taught separately as a secular
science espoused by Muslims, Christians, Jews and others outside the confines
of their religious confessions. These disciplines certainly eyed each other with
considerable suspicion, and at times with outright hostility. There were some
instances of methodological conciliation and many others of conflict, as is clear
in the philosophers and also in well-known theologians such as al-Ghazali,
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and al-Iji. While the present chapter focuses for the most
part on falsafa, some remarks on kalam are in order.

'Ilm al-kalam, or Islamic philosophical theology
The mutakallimun are generally divided into two camps, the Mu'tazilites
and the Ash'aris, although reasoned theological disputes antedate these groupings. The major centres of kalam were Ba~ra and Baghdad, although it was
practised widely with great diversity of doctrine and reasoning. Mu'tazilism is
traced to Wa~l ibn 'A~a' (d. 131/748£), who in the matter of grave violation of
religious law is said to have separated himself (i'tazala) from the extreme
positions of the Kharijite charge ofkuJr (unbelief), entailing ostracism from the
Muslim community, and the Murji'ite view of the offender as remaining a
believer within the community. The term may also denote a middle position
in the dispute over 'Ali's succession as leader of the Muslim community.
Mu'tazilites are often characterised as holding for rational criteria in theological issues, as is evident in the five principles found in 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. c. 4151
1025): taw~id (divine unity and uniqueness); 'adl (justice); al-wa'd wa-l-wa'id
(promise and threat, reward and punishment in the afterlife); al-manzila bayna
al-manzilatayn (the intermediate position mentioned); and al-amr bi-l-ma'riif
wal-nahy 'an al-munkar (the commanding of good and prohibition of evil).2
There is an insistence on the value and efficacy of human rationality present in
all these issues. As Frank remarks, 'The earlier Mu'tazilite masters held that
the mind's autonomous judgment, based on purely rational principles and
axioms, is the sole arbiter of what must be or what may be true in theology
2

For a translation of the 'Book of the five principles' by 'Abd al-Jabbar and a discussion of
classical and modern Mu'tazilism see Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, with
Dwi S. Atrnaja, Deftnders of reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism from medieval school to modern
symbol (Oxford, 1997). Also see D. Girnaret, 'Mu'tazila', Ei2, vol. VII, pp. 782-93, available
at www.brillonline.nllsubscriber / entry?entry=islam_COM-0822'.
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and their theology is, in this and in other respects, rationalistic in the proper
sense of the term.'3 This is particularly evident in regard to divine justice, which
Mu'tazilites famously held necessarily to entail a strong assertion of human free
will for the sake of moral responsibility and justly deserved divine reward and
punishment. There also followed from the negative theology of their conception of taw~ld that the Qur'an is created, not eternal, a doctrine that was a key
point of contention during the infamous m*na of third 1ninth-century Baghdad.
The basis for this teaching was their ontological atomism, which held that all
created things are composed of atoms and accidents,4 while God alone is eternal
absolute unity without attributes distinct from his essence. s
Sophisticated opposition to this rationalist approach and the limitation of divine
will and power it appears to entail was set forth vehemently by Abu '1-f:Iasan
al-Ash'ari, who was born in B<l(lra in 260/873 and died in Baghdad in 3241 935f. First
a student of the Mu'tazilite Abu 'Ali al:Iubba'i in B<l(lra, al-Ash'ari held for a more
literal approach to the statements of the Qur'an following the views of the
Baghdad jurist Ibn I;Ianbal (d. 241/855) who was imprisoned during the m*na
for refusing to accept the created nature of the Qur'an. While Ibn I;Ianbal rejected
anthropomorphism, as did the Mu'tazilites, he famously refused to accept extensive allegorical interpretation of scripture, and instead asserted that divine attributes and other assertions about God must be accepted in their transcendent
mystery Vi-Iii-kay[, that is, without asking precisely how they can characterise the
Divine in a way acceptable to human reasoning. Al-Ash'ari followed Ibn I;Ianbal in
this and held the Qur'an to be the uncreated speech of God, by whose will and
action alone all things exist. 6 His doctrine of occasionalism, which ascribes all
agency to God who acts without restriction on his will, even in the case of acts
3 R. M. Frank, 'Elements in the development of the teaching of Ash'ari', Le Museon, 104
(I99I), p. I44; repro in Dimitri Gutas (ed.), Richard M. Frank: Early Islamic theology: The
Mu'tazilites and al-Ash'an: Texts and studies on the development and history ofkaliim, vol. II
(Aldershot, 2005).
4 For brief accounts see M. Rashed, 'Narural philosophy", in P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor
(eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy (Cambridge, 2005); and Jon
McGinnis, 'Arabic and Islamic narural philosophy and narural science', in Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.
edu/ entries/ arabic-islamic-narural/, first published I9 December 2006. A more comprehensive account is found in A. Dhanani, The physical theory ofkalam: Atoms, space, and void
in Bastian Mu'tazili cosmology (Leiden, I994).
See Peter Adamson, 'ai-Kind! and the Mu'tazila: Divine attributes, creation and freedom',
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, I3 (2003); and Catarina Bello, 'Mu'tazilites, al-Ash'ari and
Maimonides on divine attributes', Veritas (Porto Alegre), 52 (2007).
6 'One must grant, in brief, that between the traditionalist fundamentalism of ibn f:lanbal
[on the one hand] and the leading masters of the Mu'tazila on the other, there may be
some third and it is, in fact, this third "intermediate way" to which the Ash'arites lay
claim': Frank., 'Elements in the development of the teaching of Ash'ari', p. I44.
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attributed to human beings, was developed in response to the perceived limitations of divine will and power set forth by the Mu'tazilites. Espousing a form of
theological voluntarism or divine command theory,7 al-Ash'arl held that 'God
determines our works and creates them as determined [and] belonging to US,8 for
'God creates it as the motion of another' such that 'our acquisition (kasba-na) is a
creation by another'9 (Sc. God). That is, the actions of human beings are created in
human beings as acquisitions from God, in whom all power for all actions, events
and things solely resides. In this way divine justice is faithfully held and defended
by the notion that 'He creates injustice for another, not for Himself, and is not
thereby unjust Himsel£'IO These and related views provided foundations for the
development of a flOUrishing Ash'arite school in Islam in which followed a long
list of theologians, many knowledgeable and sophisticated in falsafa, such as Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi (d. 6061r209) and al-lji (d. c. 7561r355).

Falsafa, or the foreign science of philosophy
Translations
Philosophy in the Islamic milieu followed upon the availability of texts of the
Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. An enormous number of translations came
from Greek or Greek via Syriac during the reign of the 'Abbasid dynasty at the
newly created city of Baghdad designed by order of the second caliph, al-Man~
(r. 136-58/754-75). His support of the intensive translation movement of more
than 200 years brought to Muslims, Christians, Jews and other thinkers in Islamic
lands the scientific and intellectual wealth of a Greek tradition stretching back to
Galen, Aristotle, Plato, the Pre-Socratics and Homer." While there is no easily
identifiable single motivating factor for this movement, it has been suggested that
a 'culture of translation' present in a 'Zoroastrian imperial ideology' was
inherited, adopted and furthered by al-M~ and his successors, who had strong
12
familial and cultural links to Persian influences. Most well known are the two

7 On theological voluntarism see Mark Murphy, 'Theological voluntarism', in Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.
edu/ entries/voluntarism-theological!, first published 8 January 2008.
8 al-Ash'arI, Kitiib al-Iuma', in Richard]. McCarthy, SJ (ed. and trans.), The theology of
al-Ash'an (Beirut, I953), Arabic, p. 35, English, p. 74 (translation modified).
9 Ibid., Arabic, p. 44, English, p. 62.
IO Ibid,. Arabic, p. 44, English, p. 64.
II See Dimitri Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic culture: The Graeco-Arabic translation movement in
Baghdad and early 'Abbiisid society (2nd-4thISth-lOth centuries) (New York and London,
I998).
I2

Ibid., pp.

40-5.
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distinct early translation movements at Baghdad in both of which Christians
played key roles: the movement associated with the circle of al-Kindl (d. 252/
866) - though some of these translations preceded al-Kindl- and the movement
initiated by the famous l:funayn ibn Isryaq al-'Ibadl, a Christian Arab. I3
Works concerning issues of metaphysics, Platonic and Aristotelian, are
strongly represented in the translations associated with al-Kindl's circle.
These include Aristotle's Metaphysics by Us!ath (Eustathios) and the
Meteorology, On the heavens, as well as works of zoology by Ibn Ba!r1q, who is
mentioned in the Fihrist of Ibn al_NadImI4 as having been commissioned to
translate by al-M~. A much modified version of the Parva naturalia bears
internal resemblance to these, as does a treatise on the De anima probably
by Ibn Ba!riq, who also translated the Timaeus of Plato, which in the
Neoplatonic tradition was read as an important work of metaphysics. One
of the most important and influential translations of this period consisted of
thoughtfully selected texts on Soul, Intellect, the One and more from Enneads
N-VI by Plotinus in three collections constituting the Plotiniana Arabica: the
Theology of Aristotle; a Treatise on divine science falsely attributed to al-Farab!;
and a group of dicta attributed to the 'Greek Sage'. Other works of
Neoplatonism such as the Introduction to arithmetic by Nicomachus and propositions from the Elements of theology by Proclus also display the common
characteristics of this group: foreign terms, transliterations, phraseology from
Greek, Persian or Syriac, neologisms and abstract nouns such as miihiyya
(which became' quiddity' in later medieval Latin translation) and more. '5 The
preface of the largest portion of Plotiniana Arabica, the Theology of
Aristotle,'6 mentions the Syrian Christian Ibn Na'ima al-~ as translator
and describes this work as an exposition by Porphyry (the original editor of the
Greek Enneads) edited by al-Kindl for Al:rrnad ibn al-Mu'ta~, son of the caliph
al-Mu'ta~ (r. 2I8-27/833-42). There the work is also characterised as 'the

13 On the importance of Christians in the development of intellectual culture in Islam with

particular reference to philosophy see Sidney H. Griffith, 'Christian philosophy in
Baghdad and beyond: A major partner in the development of classical Islamic intellectual culture', in The church in the shadow of the mosque: Christians and Muslims in the world
of Islam (Princeton and Oxford, 2008).
14 This catalogue contains a wealth of information on translations. See Ibn al-NadIm, Kitab
aljihrist, ed. G. Fliigel, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1871-2); also in Kitab aljihrist, ed. Rida Tajaddud
(Tehran, 1971); trans. Bayard Dodge as The Fihrist ofal-Nadim, 2 vols. (New York, 1970).
IS See Gerhard Endress, 'The circle of al-KindI: Early Arabic translations from the Greek
and the rise of Islamic philosophy', in Gerhard Endress and Remke Kruk (eds.), The
ancient tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism (Leiden, 1997), esp. pp. 58-62.
16 See Peter Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A philosophical study of the 'Theology of Aristotle'
(London, 2002).
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totality of our philosophy' in accord with what has already been spelled out in
the Metaphysics. l ? More than a mere translation, this work contains significant
omissions, interpolations and also translations of an Aristotelian flavour that
produced a deliberately crafted hybrid metaphysics in which the Neoplatonic
One beyond being and naming is restyled in Aristotelian fashion as being and
actuality, albeit now understood in a thoroughly non-Aristotelian way as pure
being and actuality without the delimitations of form. This philosophical
transformation gave rise to an early form of the distinction of essence and
existence in medieval philosophy and was reflected in chapter 8 of another
work of the circle of al-KindI, the Kitab al-J4a~ fi al-khayr al-maW (Exposition on
the pure good) (which powerfully influenced metaphysical thought in the
Latin West under the title Liber de causis (Book of causes)).18 In this work the
First Cause is said to be anniyya faqat Conly being', esse tantum), while all
created things are form and being.19 This hybrid metaphysics also set forth an
influential account of divine analogical predication which negated any comprehensive natural knowledge of God and set out a negative theology by
denying of God the names of created things. At the same time it permitted
affirmative predication of attributes with the proviso that they be understood
in a higher, more transcendent way in God, the cause of all things. The
Plotinian doctrine of soul as both universal and transcendent was also harmonised with the Aristotelian hylomorphic doctrine to some degree by the translator / adaptor in a way that preserved the transcendent origin and nature of
the individual rational soul while retaining the Aristotelian view of it as form,
actuality and perfection in relation to the body.20 The Theology also contains
Plotinus' famous account of the soul's mystical ascent to the One, an ascent in
which the soul 'is able to recognize the glory, light and splendour of the intellect and
to recognize the power of that thing which is above the intellect, being the light
of lights, the beauty of all beauty and the splendour of all splendour'.21 The
17 ,]urnlata falsafati-na': Plotinus apudArabes, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo, 1947), p. 6; English trans.

18
19
20
21

of most of the Plotiniana Arabica by G. Lewis in Plotini opera, vol. II: Enneades IV-V, ed.
P. Henry and H. -R. Schwyzer (Paris and Brussels, 1959).
See Cristina D'Ancona and Richard C. Taylor, 'Le Liber de causis', in Richard Goulet
et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire de philosophes antiques: Supplement (Paris, 2003).
See Richard C. Taylor, 'Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the metaphysics of being
and actuality', Journal of the History of Ideas, 59 (1998).
See the detailed account of this in Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, pp. 49-68.
See Plotinus apud Arabes, p. 56; English trans., Plotini opera, p. 375 (translation slightly
modified). In his translation Lewis uses italics to indicate corresponding Greek text and
normal script to indicate additions and interpolations not found in the original Greek.
On 'the splendour of all splendour' see C. Bucur and B. G. Bucur, "'The place of
splendor and light": Observations on the paraphrasing of Enn 4.8.1 in the Theology of
Aristotle', Le Museon, 119 (2006).
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much-read Plotiniana Arabica, and these views in particular, exercised a significant influence on later philosophical thinkers.22
A more sophisticated and enduring tradition of translation was initiated by
the Nestorian Christian l:Iunayn ibn Is4aq al-'Ibadi (d. 260/873), who was
expelled from medical studies by Yl14anna ibn Masawayh only to reappear a
few years later reciting Homer in Greek. 23 His deep interest in medicine
coincided with strong demand for translations of medical works. He is said to
have translated over 100 works by Galen as well as works by Hippocrates and
the pharmaceutical Material medica by Dioscorides. Although learned in Syriac,
Greek and Arabic, l:Iunayn himself often translated from Greek into Syriac,
with others of his group translating from Syriac into Arabic. Working with his
son, Is4aq, and many others, l:Iunayn followed a much more sophisticated
understanding and scientific methodology. Translations by this group are much
more precise, especially in contrast to the paraphrasing and modifying tendencies found in works studied in the circle of al-Kindi. They made a deliberate
effort to form a technical vocabulary for science and philosophy in Arabic, and
at the same time to capture the sense of the texts without a slavish literalness
following the original. Both a prime motivation for this and also its value to the
philosophical tradition in Arabic are aptly described by Dimitri Gutas:
The high level of translation technique and philological accuracy achieved by
Hunayn, his associates, and other translators early in the fourth 1tenth century
was due to the incentive provided by the munificence of their sponsors, a
munificence which in tum was due to the prestige that Baghdadi society
attached to the translated works and the knowledge of their contents. Better
long-term investment was perhaps never made, for the result was spectacular
for the Arabic language and Arabic letters. The translators developed an
Arabic vocabulary and style for scientific discourse that remained standard
well into the present century.24
They also produced translations of a much wider variety, among them
summaries or complete translations of works such as the Timaeus, Sophist,
Politics and Laws by Plato and most of the Organon as well as the Rhetoric,
PhysiCS, On generation and corruption, On the soul, Metaphysics, Nicomachean
ethics and Magna moralia of Aristotle. l:Iunayn himself is said to have provided
22 See Peter Adamson, 'The Theology of Aristotle', section 5, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, available at / / plato.stanford.edu / entries / theology·
aristotle/, first published 5 June 2008.
23 See G. Strohmaier, 'Homer in Bagdad', Byzantinos/avica, 41 (1980); G. Strohmaier,
'Hunayn b. Isl).ak al-'Ibadi,' EI2, vol. III, 578-9, available at www.brillonline.nll
subscriber! entry?entry=islam_COM-0300, Marquette University, 27 February 2009.
24 Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic culture, p. 14I.
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an explanatory account of the Republic of Plato. Islfaq translated the De anima
and the Paraphrase of it by Themistius and also worked with the Sabian Thabit
ibn Qurra from I:Iarran, where Neopythagorean interest in astrology and
mathematics was strong. Thabit commented on Aristotle's Physics, and corrected Islfaq's version of the Elements of Euclid and the Almagest of Ptolemy.
Many other translators were active in this period, among them: Qusta ibn
Luqa, a Christian and expert in medicine who translated works of Galen and
Hippocrates as well as the Metaphysics of Theophrastus, the Mechanica of
Hero, the Arithmetica of Diophantus, and a Placita philosophorum (Opinions
of the philosophers) and also works of astronomy, and who was probably
involved in translations of Aristotle's Physics and works of Alexander of
Aphrodisias and John Philoponus; and Abu 'Uthman al-DimashqI, a Muslim
who translated works of medicine and mathematics as well as Aristotle's
Topics, Porphyry's Isagoge and works by Alexander. Other translations of
texts of Alexander, Porphyry, Proclus, Themistius, Nemesius and others
were also made available in this period when works might be translated
twice or more. This tradition of translation continued at Baghdad well into
the fourthltenth century, when al-FarabI set out the philosophical foundations
for the classical rationalist tradition. New translations, revisions of earlier
versions and commentaries and explications of Greek philosophy abounded
in a continuation of cooperation of philosophers and translators to bring this
secular learning to prominence alongside the ongoing development of religious thought in their diverse Abrahamic traditions. Abu Bishr Matta ibn
Yiinus (d. 328/940) led a second wave of translations from Syriac, rendering
Aristotle's account of Divinity in book I2 of the Metaphysics together with a
commentary by Alexander, in addition to translations of Aristotle's Posterior
analytics, Meteorology, On sense, Poetics and On the heavens. He is also credited
with being the teacher of the philosopher al-Farabi The Christian logician
Yalfya ibn 'AdI (d. 363/974), a student of al-FarabI, engaged in philosophical
and theological debates and also was involved in the translations of Aristotle's
Categories, Topics, Sophistics, Physics, On the soul, Metaphysics and Poetics, as well
as the Metaphysics of Theophrastus and commentaries on Aristotle from the
Greek tradition. 25 As the era of translation was coming to an end, Ibn

25 Many of the commentaries made available were of works from the dominant

Neoplatonic tradition. For details see Cristina D' Ancona, 'Greek into Arabic:
Neoplatonism in translation', in Adamson and Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge companion
to Arabic philosophy; Cristina D'Ancona, 'Greek sources in Arabic and Islamic philosophy', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia ofphilosophy, available at http://
plato.stanford.edul entries I arabic-islamic·greek/, first published 23 February 2009.
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al-Khammar (d. 40S/rOI7) and Ibn Zur'a (d. 399/lOoS) translated works of
Aristotle including On the generation of animals, History of animals and
Meteorology. However, scientific achievements advancing beyond translated
sources were well under way, as was the formation of new philosophical
syntheses which developed into philosophical approaches native to the Islamic
milieu. With the conclusion of the translation movement the cultural assimilation of Greek philosophical thought begun in earnest with al-Kindl, furthered by al-Farabl and the Baghdad Aristotelians, as well as the Humanists of
Abu Sulayman al-Sijistams circle, came to fruition in the brilliant mind of
Avicenna, who crafted a genuinely new philosophical account that proved to
be profoundly influential among many later philosophers and mutakallimun.
aI-Kindt (d. 252/866)

Known as 'the philosopher of the Arabs', al-Kindt played the roles of philosopher, adaptor, text editor, organiser and leader for a group of translators and
thinkers versed in the philosophical works of Aristotle and at the same time
much attached to the philosophical teachings of the Neoplatonic tradition. With
the support of members of the caliphal family, al-Kindt was the first major
philosopher of the Arabic tradition to promulgate the ideas of the Greek
tradition in a concerted effort to establish a firm place in the Islamic milieu for
the secular and foreign science of philosophy. For nearly thirty years of aI-Kindt' s
adult life the mi~na, or imposition of religious views by al-Ma'miin and his
successors, was in effect, with its distinctive insistence upon the created nature
of the Qur'an, a doctrine characteristic of Mu'tazilite teachings whose position
on divine attributes may be consonant with that espoused by al-Kindt on the
basis of philosophical argumentation from the Neoplatonic tradition. Author of
perhaps as many as 250 works, al-Kindt wrote on cosmology, mathematics,
optics, music and medicine, as well as metaphysics, philosophical psychology
and ethics. All but a small selection of his works are lost, though what remains
extant provides valuable information on his philosophical thought.
Perhaps the most valuable of the surviving works of al-Kindt is a portion of
his On first philosophy in which we find him both advocating insistently for
the study of Greek philosophy in his day as a sound and valuable approach to
the true understanding of the nature of Divinity religiously revealed in the Qur'an
and also demonstrating the powerful argumentation of the Neoplatonists in
behalf of divine unity (taw~ld). In his thoughtfully structured argument in the
preface, he establishes that philosophy at its highest level is consonant with Islam
in that 'the noblest part of philosophy and the highest in rank is the
First Philosophy, i.e., knowledge of the First Truth Who is the cause of all
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trUth,.26 Logic and Aristotle's account of the four causes - material, efficient,
formal and final- reveal the definitions essential to the attainment of knowledge
and truth under the methods of the ancient philosophers, to whom thanks are
owed. He then proceeds to attack as devoid of religion those theologians of his
day who, with their weak methods, little knowledge, poor interpretations and
undeserved positions of leadership, label as unbelief (kufr) the philosophical
understanding of the real natures of things ('ilm al-ashyii' bUJaqii'iqi-hii). Yet they
do not understand that what they condemn encompasses the knowledge of
divinity, unity and virtue brought by true messengers (al-rnsul al-~iqa) in
confirmation of the divinity of God with truth which even these who oppose
philosophy are required to acknowledge as necessary. He then closes the
preface with an appeal to God for support and defence in this work which
will argue for God's divinity, explain His unity, and defend God against
unbelievers with arguments (bi-l-~ujaj) squelching their unbelieC7 In this way
al-KindI understands philosophy, as found in Aristotelian metaphysics, the
Neoplatonism of the Plotinumfl Arabica and Arabic texts from the Elements of
theology of Proclus, to constitute a Single philosophical investigation that has
divine unity (taw~1d) as its object, just as Islamic theology has as its object taw~1d
and what it entails. That is, he determines that metaphysics has God as its object
and he asserts that this philosophical study of divinity with its method of
definition and demonstration is an equal to the methods of Islamic revelation
and theology in the attainment of the knowledge of the divinity and unity of
God. While the determination of God as object of this science has important
ramifications for the study of metaphysics, the assertion of an equality of
philosophy and religion marks the initiation of argumentation that would be
used to assert the primacy of philosophy over theology in the thought of a
number of major philosophers in Islam. The terms in which al-KindI framed the
debate set the stage for the classical rationalist accounts of al-FarabI, Avicenna
and Averroes which find the necessity of philosophical methods, particularly the
ideals of demonstration, to yield a certain primacy for philosophy in the
interpretation of revelation.
In what remains of the incomplete version of On first philosophy extant
today, al-KindI argues for the physical and temporal finitude of body and,

26 ai-Kind!, Oeuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindt, ed. Roshdi Roshed and Jean
Jolivet, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997-8), vol. II, p. 9. English translation in al-Kindi, al-Kindi's

metaphysics: A translation ofYa'qub ibn Is~iiq ai-Kindt's Treatise 'Onjirst philosophy' (Fi alfalsafah al-uHi), trans. Alfred Ivry, Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science (Albany,
1974), p. 58.
27 aI-Kindt, Oeuvres philosophiques, vol. II, pp. II-I7; aI-Kind!, al-Kindl's metaphysics, pp. 56-60.
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under the influence of arguments from Philoponus, rejects the common view
of Aristotle and the Neoplatonic tradition that the world is eternal, instead
insisting upon its creation. He further supports this conclusion by reasoning
that unity in individual things is accidental, not true unity, and that it must
have as an agent cause the One for creation in unity and existence, for
conservation in being, for motion, and for all the various forms of unity. In
the True One itself there is a unity of oneness and being requiring the denial of
attributes, though in all other things there must be caused unity as a necessary
condition for being. 'The cause of unity in unified things is accordingly the
True One, the First, and everything which receives unity is caused, every one
other than the One in truth being one metaphorically and not in truth' (fa-kullu
wa[.ridin ghayra al-wa[.rid bi-1-4aqlqati fa-huwa bi-l-majazi 180 bi-1-4aqlqati).28
A similar account of metaphorical predication and the derivative reality of
creatures is found in his Treatise on the one true [and] peifect agent and the deficient
agent which is [so] by metaphor. There al-Kindl reasons that act (ft'I) is an
equivocal term only properly predicated of God whose act of creation (ibdii')
presupposes nothing in his true act of 'making existents to exist from nonexistence' (ta'y1s al-ays8ot 'an laysa).29 Secondary and metaphorical is the agency
of an intermediary which acts upon something else and yet is itself dependent
upon the agency of the Creator for the power by which it acts. But only the Creator
is an agent in the proper sense, presupposing no other agency, and providing agency
immediately and mediately to creatures acting in virtue of the Creator's true agency.
This account of primary and secondary causality was a commonplace of the
Neoplatonic tradition and is similar to that found in the Kitiib aI-iqaJ;t fi al-khayr aIma1:uJ mentioned earlier, another work associated with the circle of al-Kinru.
In his philosophical psychology al-Kindl writes of four intellects: three are
characteristics of the immortal human soul and the fourth is the transcendent
agent intellect in an interpretation of Aristotle's underdetermined account in
De anima 3.5. Yet while he speaks of what is sensible in act being acquired by
the soul, knowledge comes not through abstraction but in the apprehension of
immaterial forms by intellect. The Platonist meaning of this is confirmed in On
recollection, where al-Kindl argues explicitly that sense perception cannot
provide knowledge of intelligible forms, which it instead apprehends through
its own essence in recollection. 3D Though the remote source is Plato, rather
28 al·Kindi, Oeuvres philosophiques, vol. II, p. 95.
29 Ibid., p. r69.
30 Gerhard Endress, 'al·Kindi's theory of anamnesis: A new text and its implications', in

Isliio e arabismo na Peninsula Ibbica: Aetas do XI Congreso da UnUio Europaeia de Arabistas e
Islam61ogos (Evora, 1986).
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than reaching back to his Phaedo for this doctrine, it seems likely that al-Kindl's
view results from late Neoplatonic debates over whether predicated universals founded on the experience of sensibles of the world can be the source of
an intellectual understanding of the transcendent forms themselves; instead,
they may merely be promptings for the soul to recollect or otherwise
31
apprehend transcendent eternal forms in the First Intellect.
Although it was eventually eclipsed in the tradition by the powerful and
creative philosophical synthesis of Avicenna, the tradition of al-Kindl continued
well into the fourth/tenth century. A follower in that tradition, al-'Amiri
(d. 381/992) used philosophical texts in the interpretation of the Qur'an and
religious teachings ofIslam. In his native Khurasan al-'Amin: studied with Abu
Zayd al-Balkhi: (d. 322/934), the well-known geographer and polymath, who
apparendy conveyed from al-Kindl to his student the value of both philosophy
and religion in understanding God and creation. Of al-'A.mirrs works there
survive treatises on optics, predestination, the defence ofIslam using philosophical argumentation, a work on the afterlife and an interesting metaphysical text,
but none of his commentaries on the works of Aristode. His familiarity with
works and arguments from the tradition of al-Kindl is particularly evident in his
Kitab al-amad 'alii I-a bad (On the afterlife?2 in which al-'Amin: draws on Plato's
Phaedo to argue for the reward or punishment of the immortal soul and in his
F~lfi al-ma'alim al-iliihiyya (Chapters on metaphysical topics) where he draws
on the Kitab al-UJii~ fi al-khayr ai-maW (Liber de causis) in its adaptation of portions
of the Elements of theology ofProclus. 33 Religion seems to playa more prominent
role in the works of al-'Amin: than in those of al-Kindl, as indicated by the
former's use of Qur'anic terms and phrases to label philosophical teachings.
Generally al-'Amiri held that philosophy plays a valuable complementary role to
that of religion in the immortal rational soul's quest for knowledge of the
Creator and His creatures. As Wakelnig puts it, al-'Amiri 'wants to relate the
concepts of Neoplatonic philosophy closely to the Koran and the Islamic
tradition, in order to show that philosophy and religion are in accordance

3I For the account of Porphyry, who may have been among the first to prompt debate of
this issue, see H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca and London, I993), pp. ro8-47.
32 For the text with English translation and srudy see Everett K. Rowson (ed. and trans.),
A Muslim philosopher on the soul and its fate: al-'Amirl's Kitiib al-abad 'ala l-abad (New
Haven, 1988).
33 For a valuable srudy of this work and al-'Amins extensive knowledge of metaphysical

texts of the Neoplatonic tradition see Elvira Wakelnig (ed. and trans.), Feder, Tafel,
Mensch: AI-'Amiri's Kitiib al-fusiil Ii: l-ma'aJim al-ilwiya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption
im
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with each other with regard to their objectives'.34 It should also be noted that his
metaphysical reflections gave rise to his use of the term wajib al-wujud ('necessary existent') in characterising divine existence, a notion that would be developed extenSively by Avicenna. 35
The rise of philosophy in the fourth/ tenth century

While al-Farabi is the most well-known philosopher of fourthltenth-century
Baghdad, his era was one of a broad diversity of intellectual flourishing in
philosophy, kalam, literature and much more, with ongoing translation, lively
philosophical and theological debate and methodologically multiple
approaches and teachings by a wide array of thinkers. It was in this period
that the iconoclastic philosopher and famous physician Abu Bakr al-Ritzi (d. c.
313-23/925-35) taught clinical medicine at Rayy and Baghdad, wrote detailed
works of medicine widely known in Islam (and translated into Latin) and
infamously held that prophecy and revelation are not necessary. Little of the
philosophical work of al-Ritzi survives, but from reports and what is available
it is clear he was much influenced by the Timaeus as well as other works by
Plato, and held a Platonic conception of the souI,36 together with a powerful
aversion to revealed religion. In a well-known debate in 320/932 the logician
and Aristotelian commentator Matta ibn Yunus, mentioned earlier as a translator, famously defended logic as a universal tool transcending the grammar
of a particular language against Abu Sa'id al-S-rrafi, who rejected that idea,
insisting that logic is merely a form of Greek grammar. AI-Farabi had the
Christian Yul:Ianna ibn f:Jaylan as a teacher for portions of the Organon and
apparently knew Matta. Yal:Iya ibn 'AdI, another Syriac Christian, was a
student of al-Farabi and became a leading figure as translator, philosopher
and theolOgian in the developing school of Baghdad Aristotelians. 37 Abu
Sulayman al-Sijistani al-Man!iqI (the logician) (d. c. 375/985), whose companion
34 Elvira Wakelnig, 'Metaphysics in al-'Amiri: The hierarchy of being and the concept of
creation', Medioevo, 32 (2007), esp. p. 46.
35 See Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's metaphysiCS in context (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 239-40.
36 Two of his important philosophical treatises are extant and available in English translation, 'Spiritual medicine' and 'The philosopher's way oflife'. See respectively, al-RazI,
The spiritual physick ofRhazes, trans. A.]. Arberry (London, 1950); and Jon McGinnis and
David C. Reisman (ed. and trans.), C/assical Arabic philosophy. An anthology of sources
(Indianapolis, 2007), pp. 36-44. For a general account of al-RazI see L. E. Goodman,
'al-RazI, Abu Bakr MuJ:lammad b. Zakariyyii', El2, vol. VIII, pp. 474-5, available at www.
brillonline.nll subscriber / entry?entry=islam_SIM-6267, Marquette University, 28
February 2009.
37 For a list of his writings see Gerhard Endress, The works ofYa~ya Ibn 'AdI: An analytical
inventory (Wiesbaden, 1977). Also see Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque,
pp.122-7.
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Abu I:Iayyan al-Tawl:p"dI recorded sessions of the circle of al-SijistanI at
Baghdad, led an intellectually rich group of thinkers, and himself held philosophy and religion as two distinct methods, philosophy concerned with the
created realm and able to know only the fact of the existence of God, not the
divine nature itself. The original version of Abu Sulayman al-SijistanI's $iwiin
al-Hikmah, a historical account of philosophy, survives only in various abbrevia~ed versions. 38 As for the group's view of the role of philosophy in relation to
religion, Kraemer writes, 'The objective of the Falasifa was to enable society to
depart safely and gradually from the old beaten paths of inherited belief.'39 For
the Isma'ili branch of Shi'ism the key to the proper guidance of the community
in all matters depends upon a divinely inspired prophet. In their theological
descriptions the Isma'ilis drew deeply on Neoplatonic thought to express their
doctrines. In this tradition Abu Ya'qub al-Sijistaru (d. c. 361/971) stressed the
complete transcendence of God beyond all intelligibility, even insisting that
there be not a single but rather a double negation said of God. As Walker puts it,
'One states that God is not not a thing, not not limited, not not describable, not
not in a place, not not in time.'40 During this period there was also under way the
assembling of the Rasii'il Ikhwiin al-$afo', a religiously inspired collection of
treatises drawing on philosophical translations, Sufism, Isma'ili thought,
Qur'anic revelation, religious teachings, politics and science, with the aim of
the purification and salvation of the SOul. 4I While by no means the sole concern
of those studying philosophy, the issue of philosophy and its relation to religion
was one of universal interest with a considerable variety of conclusions reached.

al-Fiiriibt (d. 3391950f)
Although Abu N~ al-Farahi is often said to have been of Turkish ethnic origin,
the historical sources vary considerably. He probably came from the eastern part
of the empire to Baghdad, where he did most of his work, for philosophical
studies, though he spent time in Damascus, Aleppo and Egypt before his death in
Baghdad. Al-Farahi understood himself and his associates to be reconstructing
philosophy as practised in the Alexandrian tradition, according to his own account
38 See Joel L. Kraemer, Philosophy in the renaissance of Islam: Abu Sulaymiin al-SijistanI and
his circle (Leiden, 1986). pp. 119ff.
39 Ibid., p. xii.
40 Paul E. Walker, 'The Isma'ilIs', in Adamson and Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge companion
to Arabic philosophy, p. 82.
41 For a recent brief account with a valuable bibliography and web links see Carmela
Baffioni, 'Ikhwan al-Safa', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia ofphilosophy, available at plato.stanford.edu I entries I ikhwan-al-safa/, first published 22 April
2008.
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his Pi ?Uhur alfalsafa (The appearance of philosophy), which - significantly makes no reference at all to the work of al-KindI or al_Raz1. 42 There al-Farab!
relates that upon the arrival of Islam philosophical studies moved from
Alexandria to Antioch and finally, on the initiative of a few individuals, made
its way to Baghdad, where religious restrictions by Christians were dismissed
and al-Farab! himself studied the entire Prior and Posterior analytics with YuJ:!anna
ibn f:Iaylan. Focus was now on the proper curriculum and order of study, and in
particular the need to begin with logical studies, in which al-Farab! himself was a
master, writing commentaries and paraphrases of the Organon and the Isagoge or
Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle by Porphyry. For al-Farab! logiC was
understood also to include rhetoric and poetics - and itself to be a sort of
universal grammar of thought and reason, in contrast to the grammars of
particular languages. And demonstration is understood as that form of syllogistic
that yields absolute certainty, while other forms of syllogistic yield lesser states of
assent by the SOul. 43 These logical notions played an important role in al-Farabi's
understanding of the roles of citizens and leaders in the state where nondemonstrative affirmations based on dialectical argumentation and rhetorical
suasion are seen to have important value for the formation of a societal
community aspiring for the full attainment of happiness. Following the hierarchical account found in Plato's Republic, al-Farab! argues in several works that
the perfect state is that in which the legislator, philosopher and imam are found
in a single person, while in less perfect cities these may be found in a plurality of
individuals, or perhaps not be found at all in those cities lacking proper hierarchy
and unity. This doctrine or political philosophy as philosophy of state involves a
special coincidence of lOgical teachings with those of cosmology, metaphysics
and philosophical psychology in al-Farab1. 44
The cosmological and metaphysical scheme crafted by al-Farab! situates the
First Cause as the First Being (al-mawjud al-awwal) and the eternal creative
emanative source for the existence (wujud) of all other beings and as itself free
in

42 This is noted by Dimitri Gutas in 'The "Alexandria to Baghdad" complex of narratives:

A contribution to the srudy of philosophical and medical historiography among the
Arabs', Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, IO (1999), p. 155.
43 See Deborah L. Black, 'Knowledge ('ilm) and certirude (yaqin) in al-FarabI's epistemol·
ogy', Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 16 (2006). On logic in al·Farab! in its historical context
see the introduction by F. W. Zimmermann to his translation of al·Farabi's commentary
and short treatise on Aristotle's De interpretatione (London, 1981).
44 For a recent synthetic account of the thought of al-Farab! on these matters see Philippe
Vallat, Farabi et l'l':cole d'Alexandrie: Des premisses de la connaissance Ii la philosophie
politique (Paris, 2004).
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of every sort of deficiency.45 The science that treats of the First Cause is
metaphysics, but it does so in so far as it treats of all being under the rubric of
being qua being. 46 Under the influence of another hybrid ofNeoplatonism and
Aristotelianism, in this case traced to Ammonius at Alexandria, al-FarabI
characterises the First Cause as the One in the most deserving sense (since
divisibility, corporeality, materiality, subject and beginning are all denied ofit)
and also as at once intellect, understood, and understanding (fa-anna-hu 'aqlun
wa-anna-hu ma'qUlun wa-anna-hu 'aqilun).47 Positive predication or naming
of the First Cause is permitted, albeit with the important restriction that these
names cannot have the meaning and level of perfection of created beings, but
instead must be predicated in accord with its ultimate and transcendent
perfection. 48 From the First Cause there emanates an intellect which thinks
(ya'qilu) its own essence and that of the First, and from the latter another
intellect results as well as the outermost heavens. This begins a series of
mediated emanations of celestial bodies and intellects extending to the eleventh intellect in the hierarchy which is the Agent Intellect (al-'aql alja((al)
associated with the sphere of the moon and the sub-lunar world.
The Agent Intellect, charged with governance of the sublunary realm in
some works but called the emanative cause of it in others, plays an essential role
in human reason and in the guidance of humanity through prophecy. Following
Alexander of Aphrodisias and most of the Greek tradition, al-FarabI understands
the Agent Intellect to be both an eternal immaterial entity existing in actuality
separate from the world and also as intimately involved in human epistemology. In an account of intellect only superficially similar to that of aI-Kind!, alFarabI explains that the intellectual apprehension necessary for the formation of
universals takes place thanks to the Agent Intellect which 'provides something
like light to the material intellect', that is, provides soul with a power by which it
transfers (yanqulu) intelligibles that 'come to be from the sensibles which are
preserved in the imaginative power'.49 In this way it abstracts or extracts

45 al-Farab!, On the peifeet state (Mabadi' ara' ahl al-madfua al-fadila), ed. and trans. Richard
Walzer (Oxford, I985), p. 57.
46 This is Significant because it entails a rejection of the approach of ai-Kind!, who

described Divinity as the object of both metaphysical and religiOUS investigation. In
contrast, al-Farab! holds the consideration of the First Cause as a special part of
metaphysics and assigns religion to a position subordinate to political governance.
47 al-Farab!, On the peifeet state, pp. 68 and 70 respectively.
48 al-Farab!, al-FJrJbi's The political regime (al-Siyasa al-madaniyya also known as the
Treatise on the prinCiples of beings), ed. Fauzi Najjar (Beirut, I964), p. 49.
49 al-Eirab!, On the peifeet state, p. 202. The term material intellect derives from Alexander of
Aphrodisias. While immaterial in itself, the material intellect derives its name from its
receptivity, which also exists, though in a different sense, in matter. Marc Geoffroy
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(tantazi'a) forms of material things in the mimetic power of imagination and
receives them as actualised intelligibles in the material intellect.50 With this
power now existing as intellect in act, the separated and immaterial intelligibles
themselves can be the objects of human intellection at a new level al-Farabi calls
acquired intellect. No longer requiring a body for its activity, the human soul
can then rise in a transformation or realisation into its immaterial substance as
intellect at the level of the Agent Intellect. For al-Farabi the attainment of the
human end to which the Agent Intellect directs the soul is happiness in the
perfection of intellect by voluntary action and individual effort in the context of
human society. The conditions for this achievement must be provided by
society, even though the majority are brought to truth not by demonstration
and the high intellectual methods of the philosopher but rather by rhetorical or
dialectical persuasion. For this reason the mimetic power of imagination is
needed by the prophet to represent the intelligibles received from the Agent
Intellect for the guidance of humanity in persuasive images for the formation of
society in the way most suitable for the attainment of happiness. 5 ! Religious
teachings here function as mimetic representations of true philosophy made
suitable in a particular culture and at a level appropriate to those incapable of
the fullness of philosophical understanding. 52
Avicenna (d. 42811°37)

It is especially fortunate that the most influential philosopher in the history of
Islamic thought, Ibn Sma or Avicenna, wrote an autobiography which is extant
with a continuation by Abu 'Ubayd al-Jiizjani. 53 There he relates that his father

50

51

52

53

argues that al-Farabi may never have read Aristotle's De anima but instead relies on
Alexander. See his 'La tradition arabe du Peri nou d' Alexandre d' Aphrodise et les
origines de la theorie farabienne des quatre degres de !'intellect', in Cristina
D'Ancona and Giuseppe Serra (eds.), Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione
Araba, Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina 3 (Padua, 2002).
AI·Farabi, Alfarabi: Risalatfi 'l-'aql, ed. Maurice Bouyges, SJ, 2nd edn (Beirut, 1983), p. 12.
On this issue see Richard C. Taylor, 'Abstraction in al-Farabr, Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, 80 (2006).
On this understanding, the thought of al-Farabi is a continuing development of the
philosophical tradition in the societal context of Islam rather than a break and an
advancement of a new science of politics. Regarding the former see Dominic
O'Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic political philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford, 2005); regarding the latter approach see Christopher A. Colmo, Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as
founder (Lanham, MD, 2005).
Therese-Anne Druart observes that al-Farabi seems to have held that ethics necessarily
involves religion for all with the exception of the true philosopher. See her 'al-Farab!
(870-958): Une ethique universelle fondee sur les intelligibles premiers', in Louis-Leon
Christians et al. (eds.), Droit naturel: Relancer l'histoire? (Brussels, 2008), p. 23I.
For this and other sources on the life of Avicenna see William E. Gohlman, The lift ofIbn
Sina: A critical edition and annotated translation (Albany, 1974). The most comprehensive
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was a government administrator and Isma'llI follower who, after moving to
Bukhara, arranged for teachers for Avicenna, who proved to have extraordinary
intellectual talents. His study of the Qur'an completed by the age of ten,
Avicenna was provided with teachers in jurisprudence and then, beginning
with the Isagoge of Porphyry, in philosophy, in which he quickly excelled his
teachers. By sixteen he was distinguished in law and medicine, and proceeded
deeper into philosophy, creating a collection of notes and proofs for himself as
he proceeded through all the branches of the discipline. His only bump in the
road was frustration with the Metaphysics of Aristotle - which he claims to
have read forty times, and even memorised, without grasping its purpose. But
thanks to the chance purchase of al-Farabl's Fi aghrii4 kitab Ma ba'd al-tam'a
(On the aims of Aristotle's Metaphysics), Avicenna was able to come to a clear
vision of Aristotle's end, one very different from al-Kindl's identification of
religious theology and metaphysics. 54 Noteworthy for the understanding of the
philosophical thought of Avicenna is the absence of reference to studies in a
particular school of thought or circle of teachers in which he learned the ways of
philosophical analysis and argumentation in a particular tradition. Rather, aside
from some modest guidance in his pre-teen and early teen years, he relied on
his own remarkable powers of intellect and approached texts of philosophy
with a genuine openness that led to new philosophical doctrines that have
had powerful and continuing influence on the development of philosophy in
Islam, and also in the West through Latin translations. His most influential
teachings are in metaphysics, and in particular concerning the nature of God.
According to Avicenna God must be conceived as the Necessary Being, the
sole being necessary in itself, and as the sole entity in which existence (wujud)
and essence (ntahiyya) are in complete unity. This is most clearly expressed in
his latest major work, his Isharat wa-tanblhat (Pointers and reminders), where
in the section on 'Existence and its causes' he distinguishes essence from
existence, argues for the need of an efficient cause of existence, and sets forth
his account of necessity and possibility in essences. Dismissing what is impossible in itself, he reasons that every chain of caused beings must be finite or
infinite and must be founded on a being which is the Subsistent and is itself the
Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud). Since every being is either necessary in its
own right or possible in its own right, and even an infinite causal chain of
possible beings cannot bring about the realised necessity of a possible being,
guide to the development of the philosophical thought of Avicenna is Dimitri Gutas's
invaluable Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition: Introduction to reading Avicenna's philosophical works (Lei den, 1988).
54 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition, pp. 238ff.
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then there must be a being necessary in itself as an uncaused cause extrinsic to
the chain as its term and foundation. This is the unique Necessary Being,
which is without definition and can be indicated by no one but he who
possesses intellectual knowledge in purity, although its existence can be
established by consideration of being itself. 55 The compact late account in
Isharat wa-tanbihat combines distinct arguments set forth elsewhere in
Avicenna, some of which have sources in early Islamic kaliim. As Wisnovsky
has shown,5 6 Avicenna's famous distinction of existence and essence is rooted
in theolOgical issues concerning the ontological status of 'thing' (shay') as
requiring a divine determinative cause for its existence, and also in al-Farabl's
metaphysical analysis of existent and thing. That distinction appears in his
earlier Metaphysics of the Shifli' where in book I, chapter 5, Avicenna considers
the notions or meanings of the existent (al-mav.jud), the thing (aI-shay') and the
necessary (al-qariLnj, and proceeds to argue that the first conceived is the
necessary (al-wajib). His famous analysis of necessity and possibility is then
found in chapter 6, where he dismisses the impossible and argues that 'whatever is possible in existence (mumkin al-wujUd) when considered in itself, its
existence and nonexistence are both due to a cause'.57 On the basis of an
analysis which has its roots in his careful consideration of Aristotle on
necessity,5 8 Avicenna then reasons with a new and widely influential argument that all that exists owes its instantiation to a necessitating that can be
traced to God as the Necessary Being. In book 8 of the same work he goes on
to offer argument for the finitude of essential causes and to conclude for the
Necessary Being as uncaused and itself a first cause ('illatun ghayra ma'lulatin
wa-'illatun ula),59 from whom eternally emanates the celestial hierarchy of
intellects, bodies and soul (book 9), which come to an end in the Agent
Intellect functioning as emanative cause of the world of generation and
corruption and all its forms. For the great majority of philosophers and
many theologians who followed, Avicenna' s metaphysical teachings were

55 Avicenna, al·Isharat wa-I-tanbthat, ed. S. Dunya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960-6), see vol. IV,
pp. 71f.; trans A.-M. Goichon in Ibn Slna, livre des directives et remarques (Beirut and Paris,
1951), pp. 3501f.
56 See Wisnovsky, Avicenna's metaphysics in context, pp. 145 If. For a short account see

Robert Wisnovsky, 'Avicenna and the Avicennian tradition', in Adamson and Taylor
(eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy, pp. 92-136.
57 Avicenna, Avicenna: The metaphysics of the healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo,
UT, 2005), p. 31.
58 See Wisnovsky, Avicenna's metaphysics in context, pp. 197-217; and Wisnovsky, 'Avicenna
and the Avicennian tradition', pp. II5-19.
59 Avicenna, The metaphysics of the healing, p. 258.
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simply accepted as providing the terminology and agenda for later philosoph60
ical and theological discussions of God and creatures.
While Avicenna was the dominant influence in metaphysics for centuries, his
philosophical psychology contained some teachings that hampered its widespread
acceptance. For, while Islam and Christianity both held for the resurrection of the
body in the afterlife, Avicenna' s philosophical argumentation, under the influence
of the late N eoplatonic school of Ammonius at Alexandria,61 held that the rational
soul alone survives the death of the body. Created by emanation in a SUitably
disposed material preparation in the womb and individuated by its initial relationship with body, the rational soul for Avicenna remains separate from the body,
functioning as its final cause and existing immaterially, as Avicenna repeatedly
reminds his readers with his famous 'flying man' in which the soul recognises its
own existence even in the absence of sensation. 62 The body and its senses also
serve the rational soul in the formation of knowledge on the part of the soul.
Sense-perception of the world is conveyed through abstraction (Wjnd) to the
common sense, then to the retentive imagination, and then to the active compositive imagination. Avicenna also asserted the existence of an intuitive power
(/;uu1s), responsible for quick - or even immediate and certain - insight into the
middle term of a syllOgism, or prophetic intuitive knowledge. These internal
powers are responsible for prenoetic bodily stages of abstraction, and it is at this
level that the estimative power (wahm) present in all animals apprehends nonsensible characteristics (intentions, ma'anin) such as those involved in the sheep's
fear in the presence of a wolf Memory and recollection complete his account of
the internal powers related to sense. Abstractions are formed by use of these
powers in the brain, although for Avicenna intelligibles in act are not realised in
human understanding without the involvement of the Agent Intellect which is
said to provide an emanation ifayq) of intelligible forms to the soul or to realise a
conjoining (ittiftl) with the Agent Intellect. The human receptive (i) material
intellect comes to be (ii) possible intellect (or dispOSitional intellect ('aql bi-lmalaka» when it has the primary principles of thought whereby it can become
60 On the development and influence of Avicenna's metaphysical thought see jules

janssens, 'Bahmanyar ibn Marzuban: A faithful disciple of Ibn SIna?', in David
C. Reisman (ed.), Before and after Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the
Avicenna Study Group (Leiden and Boston, 2003); and jules janssens, 'Bahmanyar, and
his revision of Ibn SIna's metaphysical project', Medioevo, 32 (2007). Also see Heidrun
Eichner, 'Dissolving the unity of metaphysics: From Fakhr ai-DIn aI-Razi to Mulla ~adra
ai-ShirazI', Medioevo, 32 (2007); and the articles by Mayer, AI-Rahim, Rizvi and Takahashi
in the bibliography to this chapter.
61 See Wisnovsky, Avicenna's metaphysics in context, pp. 21-141; Wisnovsky, 'Avicenna and
the Avicennian tradition', pp. 96-ID4.
62 Michael Marmura, 'Avicenna's "Flying Man" in context', Monist, 69 (1986).
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(iii) the perfection of this power as intellect in act ('aql bi-l:fi'l) as able to know at

will previously attained intelligible fonus. This latter is intellect in potency in

comparison to (iv) acquired intellect ('aql mustaJad) which is the immediate state
of actual conjoining with the Agent Intellect and apprehending intelligible fonus.
Those intelligibles in act exist as such only in the Agent Intellect with the result
that for the actuality of knowledge the rational soul, which is without intellectual
memory, reverts to conjoining with the Agent Intellect which provides the fonus
for human intellection as well as those constituting the world when the receptive
subject is suitably disposed. 63 Prophecy also occurs intuitively in a select few
through a natural emanation from the Agent Intellect or Holy Spirit.

al-Ghazalt (d. 50511111)
The philosophical accounts of al-Farabi and Avicenna conveyed an intellectually
powerful understanding of the world, human nature and the Creator; but
significant parts of their views conflicted with common Islamic religious tenets,
and prompted the Ash'arite theologian and teacher al-Ghazali to attain a
mastery of parts of philosophy in order to craft a detailed response. Based on
philosophical studies reflected in his summary of Avicennian thought in the
Maqi4id alfaliisifa (Intentions of the philosophers),64 al-Ghazili authored his
incisive Tahafut alfaliisifa (Incoherence of the philosophers)65 as a revelation of
the philosophers' dissimulations and as a detailed refutation indicating the
inadequacy of the arguments of the philosophers for key positions. In particular
he held that they and their followers should be condemned as unbelievers for
three metaphysical doctrines: (r) denial of resurrection of the human body on
the last day; (2) denial of God's knowledge of particulars; and (3) assertion of the
past and future eternity of the world. Particularly interesting are his accounts of
agency and causality. In the third discussion al-Ghazali argues that the very
notion of agency must include that of will such that the philosophers' assertion
that the world emanates necessarily by divine agency is incoherent. Rather,
God as agent of the world acts by a will free of all determination other than that
of the will itself. In the seventeenth discussion al-Ghazali famously denies that
Avicenna's De anima (Arabic text) being the psychological part of
Kitiib al·shira', ed. F. Rahman (London, 1959), pp. 48 ff. The often-used term wahib
al·-?t!war, 'the giver of forms', appears at Avicenna, The metaphysics of the healing, p, 337.
64 The Maqi4id alfaliisifa is based on Avicenna's Persian Danish nama-i alii'!. Regarding an
untitled work by al-Ghazii.li on the metaphysical thought of the philosophers, see Frank
Griffe!, 'MS London, British Library Or. 3126: An unknown work by al-Ghazii.li on
metaphysics and philosophical theology', Journal of Islamic Studies, 17 (2006).
65 See al-Ghaziil!, The incoherence of the philosopherslTahajitt alfaliisifa, a parallel EnglishArabic text, ed. and trans. M. E. Marmura (Provo, UT, 1997).
63 This account is based on
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there is a necessary connection between cause and effect, asserting a doctrine of
occasionalism which places all causal agency immediately with God. There
al-GhazalI also provides a second account closer to the philosophical account of
primary and secondary causality which also finds in God the causality for all
events. Whether al-GhazalI in fact prefers this second philosophical account is a
matter of controversy among scholars today.66 While the Tahafot was written
to combat the ways of the philosophers, al-GhazalI's strong approval of the
value of philosophical logiC and natural philosophy in his Tahafot, his
al-Munqidh min al-q.alal (Deliverance from error), and some other works contributed influentially to the introduction of methods of logic and natural
philosophy into kalam. Even some doctrines of metaphysics, which al-GhazalI
specifically condemns, were eventually adopted from Avicenna by the kalam
tradition in a way that allowed the introduction of methods from the foreign
science of philosophy into traditional discussions of kalam. Though he taught
the value of religious faith and tradition, al-GhazalI's analysis in the Munqidh
comes to the conclusion that the most certain and fulfilling method is that of the
Sufi way of life in the immediacy of the mystical experience (dhawq).6 7

Falsafa in Andalusia
In the western lands of Islam philosophy rose to prominence in the twelfth
century, though texts from the east were available earlier. This is clear in the
Jewish poet Solomon Ibn Gabirol (d. c. IOSS), who wrote the philosophical
dialogue Mekor hayyim (known as Fons vitae in its highly influential Latin
translation) which espoused a doctrine of universal hylomorphism crafted
under the influence of the Plotiniana Arabica, among other works. 68
The first major Muslim philosopher was Ibn Bajja/ Avempace (d. S33/II39),
who was a poet and philosopher as well as a person of political engagement
serving different times as vizer, emissary or judge (qaqI) , with these involvements perhaps contributing to his death in Fez - reportedly by poisoning. He
was deeply interested in Aristotelian natural philosophy, to which he applied a
66 An analysis with reference to the issues and literature is available in Frank Griffel,
'al-GhazalI', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia ofphilosophy, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ al-ghazali/, first published 14 September 2007.
67 Al-GhazaIi, al-Munqidh min al-4aliillErreur et de!ivrance, ed. and trans. F. Jabre (Beirut,
1959), Arabic p. 44; English trans. Richard Joseph McCarthy SJ in Freedom and folfillment:
An annotated translation of al-Ghazilil's al-Munqidh min al-~aJa] and other relevant works by
al-Ghazilli (Boston, I980), p. TOO; repr. as al-Ghazali's path to Sufism (Louisville, 2000).
68 See Sarah Pessin, 'Jewish Neoplatonism: Being above being and divine emanation in
Solomon ibn Gabirol and Isaac Israeli', in Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (eds.) The
Cambridge companion to medievaljewish philosophy (Cambridge, 2003).

553

The New Cambridge History of Islam

new conception of the dynamics of motion and argued against Aristotle's
rejection of motion in a void, possibly under some influence of the writings
ofJohn Philoponus. In philosophical psychology Ibn Bajja wrote a De anima after
Aristotle; but in that and also in his Risala itt4al al-'aql bi-l-insan (On the
conjoining of the intellect with human beings) and his Risala al-wadii' (Letter
of farewell) the influence of al-Farab! and critical arguments from the
Neoplatonic tradition are evident. Following al-Farab! in part, Ibn Bajja presented an account of the formation of abstractions from sense in which imagination plays a double role of spiritualising (or de-materialising) forms or
intentions and of being the subject for abstractions in so far as it functions as
the personal material intellect belonging to each human being individually.6 9
But under the influence of Neoplatonism Ibn Bajja rejected Aristotle's Third
Man Argument in critique of the Platonic Theory of Forms and insisted that true
intelligibles are not intentions abstracted from experience of imperfect particulars, but rather are those found united in the transcendent Agent Intellect.
Efforts at abstraction from sensory experience can never yield more than the
imperfect content of the objects experienced. Hence, human epistemological
advancement through the stages of abstraction is merely preparatory for the
soul's gradual ascent from ideas through ideas to ideas found in the Agent
Intellect. Science and the attainment of knowledge in all their levels are in this
way the means to the end of ultimate human happiness in an immaterial uniting
and conjoining with the Agent Intellect?O In his Tadblr al-mutawa~~id (Rule of
the solitary) he speaks of the happy in an imperfect city, explaining that the life
of the body must be renounced since it is without happiness, while the spiritual
is to be embraced for its nobility. But it is the life of the wise person or
philosopher that is virtuous and divine, for it is through intellectual understanding of transcendent intellects that he comes himself to be intellect and
attain a kind of divinity and perfect happiness. This can come to pass only if one
declines association with those devoted to the body and pursues association
with those who are spiritual, and ultimately with those who are at the highest
level of intellect?'

69 Ibn Biijja, Risalat itt4al al-'aql bi·l-insan, ed. and trans. Miguel Asin Palacios in 'Tratado

de Avempace sobre la union del intelecto con el hombre', al-Andalus, 7 ('942), pp. '-47,
Arabic pp. 13-16; English trans. in McGillis and Reisman (ed. and trans.), Classical Arabic

philosophy.
70

See Alexander Altmann, 'Ibn Bajja on man's ultimate felicity', in Harry Austryn WolfSon

jubilee volume, 3 vols. Oerusalem, 1965) vol. I.
71 For a recent and very valuable short account of Ibn Biijja and his works see Josep Puig

Montada, 'Ibn Baiia', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,
available at http://plato.stanford.edu / entries/ ibn-bajja /, first published 28 September 2007.
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A very different approach to the imperfection of human cities and the goal
of the philosopher is found in the philosophical novel ljayy ibn Yaq?iin by the
physician Ibn Tufayl (d. s8r I n8sf.) who also served as vizier to the caliph Abu
Ya'qub Yusuf (d. s8o/n84). Under inspiration from Avicenna's allegorical
Epistle of ljayy ibn Yaq?iin, Ibn Tufayl crafted the story of I:Iayy with two
possible beginnings. The first is that he was born to the king's sister, who
sought to save this child of a secret marriage by setting him to sea in a small
boat which reached a deserted isle where the child was discovered and raised
by a gazelle. The second account has it that a mixture of material constituents
advanced to the point of being a preparation sufficient for the reception of a
human soul from God (after Avicenna). Passing through several stages of
development, I:Iayy learns natural science and even the nature of the soul,
advancing to reason the necessary existence of a First Cause for the world and
the heavens. Displaying obvious Sufi influence, I:Iayy realises that his fulfilment is to be found in imitating the ways of the Necessary Being and in
exercises leading to the mystical vision of the Divine. But the life of I:Iayy
changes through a meeting with a visitor, Absal, who pursues the deeper inner
meanings of religion and had left behind his contemporary, Salaman, who
prefers the literal and surface interpretation of religious law. I:Iayy eventually
learns language and Absal explains to him the ways of organised religion that
guides the mass of humanity in their weakness of mind and will. At the
opportunity of a passing boat, the two travel to the island city ruled by
Salaman. There I:Iayy views the ignorance and preference for passions and
sensory pleasures of the people of that society in their inability or unwillingness to know and to follow the true ways of God. He and Absal then retreat
from the island of Salaman and return together to their contemplative ways on
I:Iayy's island. With this story Ibn Tufayl expressed despair for the masses in
imperfect societies and endorsed the need for the individual through Sufism to
find happiness and transcendent mystical fulfilment in the inner reaches of the
human rational soul independent of the strictures of traditional religion?2
Averroes (d. 59511198)

Ibn Rushdl Averroes was trained in law (jiqh), as were his father and his famous
grandfather, for whom he was named, and put skills of careful textual scholarship and of persuasive argumentation to work both in his professional career as
lawyer and judge and also in his philosophical studies. He was known in the
72 See Josep Puig Montada, 'Philosophy in Andalusia: Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl', in
Adamson and Taylor (eds,), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy.
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philosophical tradition in Islam though no school based on his thought was
established and no great prominence was given to his writings. In the Latin west
he was a figure of enormous influence through his purportedly demonstrative
commentaries on the works of Aristotle, which taught theologians and philosophers of medieval Europe how to understand Aristotle's difficult texts. There
his work soon engendered condemnation for its support of the genuinely
Aristotelian doctrines of the eternity of the world and of happiness attainable
in the earthly life, and for his own novel doctrine of the unique separately
existing material intellect shared by all human knowers. In the initial wave of
Latin translations in the early thirteenth century there were included none of his
dialectical writings written for a less expert audience: his legal treatise F4$1 almaqal, his short explanatory al-Masa'il allan dhakara-ha al-shaykh AbU al-Walid fi
'F4$1 al-maqal' (Treatise on what Averroes mentioned in the 'Decisive treatise'),
his theological al-Kashf 'an maniihij al-adilla fi 'aqa'id ai-milia (Explanation of
the sorts of proofs in the doctrines of religion) and his detailed response to
al-Ghazali in the Tahiifot at-tahiifot (Incoherence of the incoherence).
Today he is perhaps best known in the Muslim world for his Fa~l al-maqal
(Book of the distinction of discourse and the establishment of the relation of
religious law and philosophy)/3 a much-misunderstood work sometimes
superficially thought to provide a harmonious account of the conciliation of
reason and philosophy with revelation and religious tradition in a way
respecting each fully and equally as sources of truth and knowledge of God
and his creation. Written as a sort ofJatwa or legal determination regarding
whether philosophy and logic should be permitted, prohibited or commanded
either as recommended or required, the Fa~l al-maqal is a carefully crafted
dialectical treatise arguing for the priority of philosophy with its method of
demonstrative reason over all other methods in the determination of the
meanings and import of religious revelation and tradition. Key to its argument
are the equivocal meanings of al-na~ar as religious reflection or Aristotelian
theoretical science; qiyiis as religious analogical reasoning or Aristotelian
syllogistic; and i'tibar as religious consideration or scientific inference
explained at the very beginning of Aristotle's Posterior analytics. These equivocations allow Averroes to substitute philosophical meanings for the theological and to assert that 'this method of reflection (al-na~ar) which religious
Law has called for is the most perfect of the kinds of reflection by the most
73 With this translation I follow A. EI Ghannouchi, 'Distinction et relation des discours
philosophique et religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Fasl al maqal ou la double verite', in R. G.
Khoury (ed.), Averroes (1126-1198) oder der Triumph des Rationalismus: Internationales
Symposium anliisslich des 800: Todestages des islamischen Philosophen (Heidelberg, 2002).
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perfect kind of qiyiis which is called demonstration (burhiin)', that is, the most
perfect and certain method of philosophy. With this reasoning and the
principle, <Truth does not contradict truth but rather is consistent with it
and bears witness to it', which is taken directly from the Prior analytics (1.32)
without mention of its source in Aristotle/ 4 Averroes declares the unity of
trUth in a way that permits philosophy with its certain (al-yaqtn) method of
demonstration a place of priority in the judgement of what is true in all
matters, including religion. This is simply because philosophical demonstration by definition itself contains truth with necessity per se, while assent
(t~dtq) through rhetorical persuasion or on the basis of dialectical assumptions does not contain truth per se but only per accidens. With this methodological approach established, Averroes goes on in the F~l al-maqiil to
reinterpret the three issues for which al-Ghazall charged the philosophers
with unbelief and to affirm precisely what al-GhazalI had claimed as unbelief
in two matters: (r) scripture itself supports a sense of eternality for the world
since the Qur'an mentions God's throne and also water as prior to creation, a
view reconcilable with the eternality of matter and the efficacy of God in
Aristotle; (2) God's knowledge is neither of universals nor of particulars since
both of those are posterior to sensation; rather, God's knowledge is distinct
from both since it is causative of particulars and universals. As for (3) resurrection of the body, in the Fa~l al-maqiil he declares it obligatory for unscientific
people (min ghayr ahl al-'ilm) and says it is unbelief to deny it?5 But in al-Rashf
'an maniihij al-adilIa fi 'aqii'id aI-milIa he explains that its true purpose is to
help the majority of humanity who live by their imaginations to reflect upon
immateriality and perhaps attain something of a proper understanding of the
invisible God?6 This is Significant because in his demonstrative Aristotelian
commentaries and other strictly philosophical works Averroes finds no room
for a teaching on the immortality of the SOULl7

74 See Richard C. Taylor, "'Truth does not contradict truth"': Averroes and the unity of
truth', Topoi, 19 (2000).
75 Averroes, Ibn Rushd (Averroes): Kitiib fa~l al-ltUlqiil, ed. George F. Hourani (Leiden, 1959),
pp. 16-17. trans. Charles E. Butterworth with facing-page Arabic text as Averroes: The
book of the decisive treatise determining the connection between the law and wisdom & epistle
dedicatory (Provo, UT, 2001).
76 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf'an maniihij al-adilla fi 'aqii'id ai-milia, ed. Mu~ammad 'Abid al-Jibri,
2nd edn (Beirut, 2001) pp. 14#., trans. Ibrahim Najjar in Averroes' exposition of religious
arguments (Oxford, 2001) pp. 64ff.
77 The distinction between dialectical and demonstrative works is indicated at Averroes,
Averroes: Tahafot at-tahafot, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S] (Beirut, 1930), pp. 427-8; trans.
Simon Van Den Bergh as Averroes' Tahafut al-tahafut (The incoherence of the incoherence),
2 vols. (London, 1969), vol. I, pp. 257-8.
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In philosophy Averroes composed early short commentaries (Mukht~arat or
jawamI') often concerned with key issues, paraphrasing middle commentaries
(sing. talkh4), detailed long commentaries (sing. shar~ or shar~ kablr) containing
the complete text of Aristotle, a very Aristotelian Commentary on the Republic of
Plato, and a brief Commentary on the De intellectu ofAlexander ofAphrodisias, as
well as shorter works on various topics, including a valuable collection of essays
under the title De substantia orbis. The Long commentaries on Aristotle's De anima,
Physics, De cae/o, Posterior analytics and Metaphysics are generally thought to
contain his most sophisticated and mature teachings. In his mature physics he
follows Aristotle's account of the eternity of the world, and reasons that God is
the unmoved mover of the outermost heavens. In metaphysics he argues for
God as pure act and thought thinking thought with knowledge of the universe
only in so far as He knows Himself as the cause of all being through a final
causality that refers all other beings to the ultimate perfection of the First. In the
early pages of his Taft'!r ma ba'd al-tam'a (Long commentary on the Metaphysics)
he even goes so far as to assert that the study of metaphysics constitutes the
most complete worship of God: 'The shan:'a specific to the philosophers is the
investigation of all beings, since the Creator is not worshipped by a worship
more noble than the knowledge of those things that He produced which lead to
the knowledge in truth of His essence - may He be exalted!'78
Averroes' most controversial and perhaps least well understood teachings
concerned the nature of human intellect, a doctrine that developed through
various stages in his short, middle and long commentaries on Aristotle's De
anima, as well as in five other works. Throughout his works Averroes
followed the common tradition holding for a transcendent Agent Intellect
involved in human intellection. The point of most contention in his thought
was the nature of the receptive material intellect. In the short commentary he
holds for a plurality of individual intellects, and follows Ibn Bajja in holding
that the human material intellect is a disposition of the forms of the imagination. In the later middle commentary he retains the plurality of intellects
and eschews his earlier view of the material intellect as too closely associated
with a power of the body truly to be intellect. He then argues that the human
material intellect must be a disposition separate from matter yet belonging to
the human being from whom it derives its individuation. In his final position
in the Long commentary on the De anima Averroes spells out a doctrine of the
transference of intentions in the abstraction of intelligibles from the
78 Averroes, Averroes Tafttr

rna ba'd af-r:abJ'at, ed. Maurice Bouyges, SJ, 4 vols. (Beirut,

52), vol. I, pp. IO.II-16. This particular text was not available in the Latin translation.
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experience of the world through the internal powers of the soul and the
abstractive 'light' of the Agent Intellect which comes to be 'form for us'. He
goes on further to insist on the unity of intelligibles for the sake of common
discourse and science (relying on reasoning from the Paraphrase of the De
anima by Themistius) and concludes to the existence of a second transcendentally existing intellect, the unique Material Intellect shared by all human
beings. In this new doctrine of intellect Averroes finds that both these transcendent Intellects must be 'in the soul' to be used by the individual knower at
will. For Averroes this very activity of intellectual understanding through use
of these two transcendent Intellects constitutes the end for human beings and
ultimate human happiness. Here and also in his other two commentaries on
the De anima there is no argument or provision for the Islamic religious
doctrine of resurrection or for personal immortality?9
In 59! / II95, just three years before his death, Averroes and his writings
were condemned, he was exiled from Cordoba for a time, and philosophy was
banned. Although the reasons for this may have been political, there is little
doubt that his philosophical rationalism pushed at the limits of Islamic
tolerance at a time when philosophy in the east had already been moving
away from Aristotelian rationalism towards becoming a truly Islamic philosophy with the integration of key religious doctrines of Islam. While his sons
are reported to have carried his books to the court of Frederick II
Hohenstaufen at Sicily,80 Averroes and his students formed no school to
continue his methodological approach in the lands of Islam. Instead, his
thought proved to be powerfully influential in Jewish circles, where
his authority displaced that of Aristotle,81 and in Christian Europe, where
his teachings were variously embraced, challenged, condemned and revivified
through the period of the Renaissance.
Sufi mysticism and a very distinctive philosophy of mystical unity and
experience was already present in Andalusia in the person of Ibn al-'Arabi

79 For a detailed discussion of the development of his doctrine of intellect see the
introduction to Averroes, Averroes (Ibn Rw;hd) of Cordoba: Long commentary on the De
anima ofAristotle, trans. Richard C. Taylor, with Therese-Anne Druart (New Haven and
London, 2009).
80 See Charles Burnett, 'The "Sons of Averroes with the emperor Frederick" and the
transmission of the philosophical works by Ibn Rushd', in Gerhard Endress and Jan
A. Aertsen (eds.), Averroes and the Aristotelian tradition: Sources, constitution and reception
of the philosophy of Ibn Rw;hd (1126-1198): Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum,
Cologne, 1996 (Leiden, 1999).
81 See Steven Harvey, 'Arabic into Hebrew: The Hebrew translation movement and the

influence of Averroes upon Jewish thought', in Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman
(eds.), The Cambridge companion to medieval}ewish philosophy (Cambridge, 2003).
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(d. 6381r240) who when very young is said to have met Averroes. Islamic
philosophy was soon also to appear in many thinkers such as the widely
travelled Andalusian philosopher Ibn Sab'In (d. 6691r270), who reflected this
movement with a philosophical approach learned in Aristotelianism and
Neoplatonism but constituted as Sufi mystical wisdom.
al-Suhraward'i (d. c. 58711191)
In the tumultuous era of the Crusades, the warrior ruler of Egypt, Syria and
Mesopotamia, Saladin (d. 5891 II93), recaptured Jerusalem in n87 from the
Christians, who had held it for nearly a century. The Christian response in the
form of the Third Crusade four years later initiated a debilitating military
struggle which came to an end in II92 with a truce with Richard the
Lionhearted. In II83 the mystic and philosopher Shihab aI-DIn Ya}:lya
al-Suhrawardl had come to recently captured Aleppo, now governed by
Saladin's young son, who came under the influence of this unorthodox and
popular philosopher. In II91 Saladin, already fully engaged with the Christians,
apparently became concerned over the stability of his hold on Aleppo and the
sway al-Suhrawardi wielded over his son. In that year Saladin ordered the
execution of al-Suhrawardl, who may well have suffered death in connection
with his philosophical views. While those views were perhaps Platonic in
political matters, the philosophy set forth by al-Suhrawardi was a novel
construction of his own making. Well versed in the history of philosophy
and in the Peripatetic tradition of al-Farabi and Avicenna, al-Suhrawardi
attacked the distinction of essence and existence in things set out by
Avicenna as merely a conceptual distinction in the mind, not in the reality
of things.
Al-Suhrawardl also rejected that tradition's epistemological foundations
for the apprehension of intelligibles and essential definitions purportedly
grasped through abstraction or emanation. Rather, true apprehension of real
essences is not mediated, but rather found in the unmediated presence (~u4ur)
of the known to the knower. Al-Suhrawardl expounds this new teaching in his
ljikmat al-ishraq (The philosophy of illumination), where he explains his
Platonism with an implicit reference to the mystical account of Plotinus
found in the Theology of Aristotle. He writes:
Plato and his companions showed plainly that they believed the Maker of the
universe and the world of intellect to be light (nur) when they said that the
pure light is the world of intellect. Of himself, Plato said that in certain of his
spiritual conditions he would shed his body and become free from matter.
Then he would see light and splendor within his essence. He would ascend to
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that all-encompassing divine cause and would seem to be located and sus82
pended in it, beholding a mighty light in that lofty and divine place.
For al-SuhrawardI the Platonic forms and the transcendent intellects of the
tradition as well as human knowers are essentially lights, for light requires no
mediation but only its own presence to make itself known. From the creative
Light of Lights (God) come all the other lights, varying in intensity as well as
other things, including time, which is without beginning or end. In this metaphysics it is the task of human beings to transcend the shadows of corporeality
and realise themselves as lights. Fully integrating into his philosophical account
passages of the Qur'an and urging his readers to the ways of prayer and religiOUS
observance, al-SuhrawardI crafted both from a critical epistemology and from his
own mystical experiences a distinctive illuminationist metaphysics of light as a
~ik1tUl. (wisdom) encompassing in a unitary way religion and philosophy.

Rejection and integration offalsafa
The prolific and influential theologian Fakhr al-DIn al-Razi (d. 606/1209) in his
early years became well versed in philosophy and read Avicenna broadly. He
furthered al-Ghazan s openness to the value of philosophical logic and argumentation by use in his own reasoning, but he was a deeply committed Ash'ari. He
rejected Avicenna's metaphysical teachings on emanationism and the restriction of
divine knowledge to universals and instead embraced the atomism and occasionalism characteristic of the Ash 'arite tradition's emphasis on divine power, though
with some significant modifications. While he frequently wrote in favour of a
thoroughgoing determinism, he found the issue of determinism and freedom
without a satisfactory resolution. He wrote: 'There is a mystery (sirr) in [this issue];
viz. that proving the existence of God compels one to uphold determinism
(jabr) ... while proving prophecy compels one to uphold [human] autonomy
(qudra). For if man does not act autonomously, what use is there in sending
prophets and in revealing scripturest 83 However, Avicenna had a lasting impact on
the discussion of metaphysical matters in both kaliim and falsafa, as thinkers from
both traditions used and developed his thinking and influenced one another. 84 The
82 al-SuhrawardI, The philosophy of illumination, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein
Ziai (Provo, UT, 1999), p. lID. Also see John Walbridge, 'SuhrawardI and illumination·

ism', in Adamson and Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy.
83 Ayman Shihadeh, The teleological ethics of Fakhr ai-Din al-RazI (Leiden, 2006), p. 39·

84 See, for example, the discussion of the metaphysical issue of al-umur al· 'amrna and the
subject of metaphysical science as developed in those traditions through the centuries
with various interactions from Fakhr ai-DIn al-Razi to Mulla ~adra in Eichner,
'Dissolving the unity of metaphysics'.
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Kitiib al-mawiiqiffi 'ilm al-kaliim (Book of stations on the science of kaliim) by the
Ash'arite theologian 'A<;iud al-DIn al-IjI (d. 7S6ir3SS) also displays a powerful
proficiency in philosophical argumentation, both in its critical assessments of the
reasoning of the falsafa tradition and in its philosophical theology in the kaliim
tradition. In six parts, this work deals with theory of knowledge and syllogistic
proof, issues of ontology, unity and causality, atoms, substance, accidents and
astronomy, God and divine attributes, actions etc. (iliihiyyiit), faith, prophecy and
more. There he rejects the notion of knowledge by presence and prefers to
understand knowledge as a created attribute. 85 Sabra rightly cites the work of alIji as an example of ' the overcoming offalsafa by kaliim' and as an example of what
the philosopher of history Ibn Khaldl1n (d. 808/1406) considered a mixing offalsafa
and kaliim, which generally 'resulted in making "the one diScipline .,. no longer
distinguishable from the other'''. 86
Efforts to integrate falsafa into Islam, found in the followers of al-Kindt, most
notably in al-'Amiri, and also in al-Suhrawardi, were continued in connection
with interpretation of Avicenna's late al-Ishiiriit wa-l-tanbthiit (Pointers and
reminders), the last section of which was read in accord with developing
mystical and illuminationist philosophical accounts. Na~lr aI-DIn al-rusi
(d. 672!r274), a Shl'I well known for his influential Akhliiq-i nii~in (Nasirian
ethics), responded to Fakhr al-DIn al-Razi in his own commentary on al-Ishiiriit
wa-l-tanbthiit. 87 He embraced Avicenna's account of possible and necessary
being leading to the assertion of the Necessary Being and furthered the
mystical reading of Avicenna with his commentary on Avicenna's Epistle of
J:Iayy ibn Yaq~iin. Qurb al-DIn aI-Shirazi (d. 7IO/UU) studied Avicenna's
al-Ishiiriit wa-l-tanmhiit with aI-rusi and wrote his own commentary on
J:Iikmat al-ishriiq (The philosophy of illumination) by al-Suhrawardi. These
were the beginnings of a philosophical tradition of thinkers united by their
interest in the integration of philosophy, religion, mysticism (under the
influence of Ibn aI-'Arabi and his followers) and illuminationism, culminating
in the founding of the 'School ofIifahan' by M"rr Damad (d. I04r/r63r) and ~dr

8S 'A9ud ai-Om al-IjI, Kitab al-mawaqiffi 'ilm al-kaliim, ed. 'Abd al-Rallman 'Umayrah, 3 vols.
(Beirut, 1997), vol. I, pp. S82ff. This text and others are cited by A. I. Sabra in 'Science and

philosophy in medieval Islamic theology: The evidence of the fourteenth cenrury',
ZGAIW, 9 (1994), pp. 18 ff. Also see Josef van Ess, Die Erkennetnislehre des 'A4udaddin alreI: Ubersetzung und Kommentar des esten Buches seiner Mawaqif(Wiesbaden, 1966).
86 Sabra, 'Science and philosophy', p. 13.
87 See Toby Mayer, 'Fakhr ad-Om ar-Razi's critique ofIbn Sma's argument for the unity of
God in the Isharat, and Na~ ad-Om at-Tiisi's defence', in David C. Reisman (ed.), Before
and after A vicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group (Leiden
and Boston, 2003).
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al-DIn al-ShIrazi or Mulla $adra (d. I050/r64o),88 whose thought continues as
foundational to modem philosophy in contemporary Iran. This can be seen in
The principles of epistemology in Islamic philosophy: Knowledge by presence 89 by the
late Iranian Shl'ite philosopher Mehdi Ha'iri (d. r999), who received a doctorate
at the University of Toronto and followed in that tradition but also integrated
90
aspects of Western philosophy into his work..

88 On 'first philosophy' and' divine science' in the metaphysical thought of Mulla ~dra see

Rudiger A=en, 'The strucrure of Mulla ~adra"s al·Ifikma al·mutta'iiliya.fi l-asfiir al·
'aqilyaa al-arba'a and his concepts of first philosophy and divine science: An essay'.
Medioevo, 32 (2007).
89 Mehdi Ha'iri Yazdi, The principles of epistemology in Islamic philosophy: Knowledge by
presence (New York. 1992).
90 Also see Hossein Ziai, 'Recent trends in Arabic and Persian philosophy", in Adamson

and Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy.

